IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE

Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency 2018

SDN/18/08

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Retail Central Bank Digital Currency Operational Considerations

IMF Working Paper

A Survey of Research on Retail Central Bank Digital Currency

WP/20/104

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John Kiff, April 29, 2021

The Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Landscape

	Retail CBDC	Wholesale CBDC	Synthetic CBDC	
Representation of sovereign currency	V	V	V	
Backed by monetary authority	V	√	√/1	
Issued by monetary authority	V	V		
Liability of monetary authority	V	V		
Accessible to the general public	V		?	
Peer-to-peer transactions	?	?	?	
Legal tender or <i>lex monetae</i>	?	?	?	
1. Backed by monetary authority deposits or wholesale CBDC				

Jurisdictions Where Retail CBDC Is Being Explored (as of April 22, 2021)				
Where central banks have launched or piloted (or soon will)				
Bahamas (fully launched)	Eastern Caribbean (pilot launched)	Jamaica (pilot launch in May)		
China (pilot launched)	Ecuador (pilot done & project discontinued)	Uruguay (pilot completed)		
Where central banks have done proofs of concepts (or soon will)				
Japan (proof of concept in Spring)	Sweden (proof of concept underway)			
Korea (proof of concept started)	Ukraine (proof of concept done)			
Where central banks are in advanced stages of research and development				
<u>Canada</u>	Russia (latest report)	United States		
Euro Area	United Kingdom			
Where central banks are still in the exploratory stages				
Australia	Iceland	Norway		
Brazil	India	Pakistan		
Chile	Indonesia	Philippines		
Curaçao en Sint Maarten	Israel	South Africa		
Czech Republic	Kenya	Switzerland		
Denmark	Kuwait	Thailand		
Eswatini	Madagascar	Trinidad and Tobago		
Finland	Malaysia	<u>Tunisia</u>		
<u>Ghana</u>	Mauritius	Turkey (update)		
Haiti (Bitkòb)	Morocco			
Hong Kong SAR	New Zealand			
Where central banks have explored or are exploring issuing retail CBDC				
(according to reputable news sources)				
<u>Bahrain</u>	Kazakhstan	Palestine		
Egypt	Lebanon	<u>Rwanda</u>		
<u>Iran</u>	Macau			

Central Bank Motivations for Issuing CBDC

Emerging Market & Developing	Advanced Economies		
Economies			
Financial digitalization and	Enhancing payment system competition		
inclusion			
Reducing physical cash costs and	In face of declining cash usage		
risks (resilience)			
Reducing dollarization	Distributing stimulus payments		
Improving monetary policy effectiveness: targeted policy, accessing granular			
real-time payments data, breaking through lower zero bound on policy rates			
Retain monetary sovereignty, including to derail global stablecoin adoption			
Cross-border payment efficiency (e.g., remittances)			

Risks of Issuing CBDC

- CBDC could affect **financial stability and banking intermediation** if it competes with bank deposits.
 - Banks could also increase their reliance on wholesale funding, with implications for funding cost and stability, and market discipline.
 - Several suggestions have been put forward to control potential banking sector disintermediation, including holding/transaction limits, variable interest rates/fees, and restricted conversion modalities.
- **CBDC may increase bank run risks** by offering a readily available, safe, and liquid alternative to deposits, depending on the CBDC's design.
- CBDC could affect the **transmission of monetary policy.**
- CBDC of reserve currency countries available across borders could increase currency substitution ("dollarization").

Design Considerations

- Availability and limitations: Decisions have to be made about who can hold CBDC, limits on holding/transaction size, offline availability and convertibility limits.
- **Privacy and transparency**: Financial integrity, privacy and transparency requirements need to be balanced.
- Interest-bearing: CBDC could be remunerated to modulate demand or enhance monetary policy transmission. Even if not interest bearing at first, capacity should be incorporated into design.
- Programmability: Point-of-sale tax payments, integration with physical devices or IoT applications, or automate distribution of economic relief based on specific demographic or other characteristics.
- Ledger (de)centralization: If a decentralized platform is chosen, decisions have to made as to whether ledger maintenance is permissioned or public.
- Cross border functionality and inter-operability?

CBDC Decision-Making Process Flow



Clarifying objectives provides a framework for balancing pros and cons of CBDC issuance and guiding design options. The decision-making process starts with understanding thoroughly the problem to be solved and the full array of solutions.

Foundational capacity assessment to determine if appropriate legal, regulatory/ supervisory frameworks in place, CB's governance, organization and risk management up to challenge of managing CBDC? If not, capacity building may be in order.

Identification of user and payment ecosystem preferences/requirements including via surveys and focus groups will drive design choices, and **feasibility of CBDC**.

Key design choices include operating model, degree of anonymity/privacy, availability/ limitations. renumeration. and platform (centralized v decentralized database)

Technology solution assessment vs design, risks and adoption criteria via **PoCs**.

Public acceptance, impacts and use cases assessment with **pilots**.

If PoC reveals gaps, further research on technology and design required.

If pilots reveal gaps, further research on use cases, design and impact.

Issue CBDC?

Exit/postpone CBDC project at least temporarily.



Discussion and Questions?

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
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Annex

Key Design Choice: Single vs Multi-Tier Operating Model



CBDC Foundational Preconditions

